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The New Treatment of Real Estate Tax Shelter
Losses Resulting From Deeds in Lieu of
Foreclosure
In Crane v. Commissioner,1 the 1947 seminal tax decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States, the Court required Mrs. Crane
to include in both the basis of her property and the amount realized
upon disposition of that property the- amount of -nonrecourse debt -
encumbering her apartment building and lot. Taxpayers, however,
have since seized the sword that slew Mrs. Crane and have impaled
the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) on countless occasions with the
operation of tax shelters. Tax shelters, in the context of this note, are
investments designed to produce tax deductions for high-bracket tax-
payers to offset their income from other sources. 2 Conflicting deci-
sions by the courts demonstrate that neither the I.R.S. nor the
judicial system has devised a method to deal in a reliable and pre-
dictable manner with the problems presented by real estate tax
shelters.
This note examines the income tax treatment of a mortgagor
when, upon the failing of a tax shelter,3 he voluntarily conveys back
to the mortgagee property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage and
realizes a loss on the transfer. Part I examines the tax shelter con-
cept, and why for many investors a deed in lieu of foreclosure is an
attractive alternative to foreclosure. Part II explores the Crane deci-
sion and its two bases for determining the amount realized from the
disposition of an asset. Part III analyzes the nature of the loss that
the mortgagor sustains on a voluntary reconveyance of the property,
and examines in particular the "sale or exchange" requirement for
capital loss treatment. Finally, Part IV discusses alternatives that
might more effectively deal with such losses.
I. Tax Shelters: How They Work and the Problems They Present
Nonrecourse debt4 has been the traditional method by which
1 331 U.S. 1 (1947). See Part II A infra for the facts of the case.
2 See Part I infra.
3 See notes 8-10 and accompanying text infra.
4 Nonrecourse debt refers to an indebtedness secured by property, unaccompanied by
personal liability of the debtor. If the debtor defaults on the debt, the creditor can look only
to the secured property for satisfaction, since he has no personal recourse against the debtor.
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taxpayers have created real estate tax shelters. The mortgagor gener-
ally gives the lender a nonrecourse note for a portion of the prop-
erty's purchase price.5 The Crane principle requires that this
nonrecourse debt be added to the property's basis,6 thereby increas-
ing the amount of the annual depreciation allowance (if the property
is depreciable). By giving a nonrecourse note, the taxpayer, often a
limited partner in a limited partnership, 7 may obtain the benefit of
this depreciation with a small actual cash outlay.
When the taxpayer begins to repay the mortgage, payments will
consist mainly of deductible interest;" gradually, however, the por-
tion of the payments representing nondeductible principal will in-
crease. As long as the depreciation deduction, which is available
without cash outlay, exceeds the amount of nondeductible principal
repayment on the debt, the taxpayer receives deductions without a
cash outlay. The resulting deductions "shelter" other income of the
taxpayer from taxation. However, when the depreciation deduction
equals the amount of principal repayment, the tax shelter collapses,
and the investor must make cash outlays exceeding the deductions he
receives from the investment.9 If the investor is receiving income
from the investment, the shelter collapses earlier, when the amount
of income plus principal repayment equals the depreciation deduc-
tion. The sine qua non, therefore, of any tax. shelter is that deduc-
tions available without cash outlay exceed nondeductible cash
expenditures. The tax shelter stands or falls on the relationship be-
5 A rational third-party lender may be willing to accept a nonrecourse note because: (1)
deficiency judgments are sometimes prohibited by state law, see, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 580b (West 1955); (2) in return for nonrecourse debt, the lender may get a higher interest
rate or an "equity kicker" (an arrangement for participation in the equity of a corporation
through stock warrants, for example, so that a lender may share in the prospective growth in
the value of the corporation's common stock, Monarch Cement Co. v. United States, 458 F.
Supp. 384, 385 (D. Kan. 1978), afd, 634 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1980)); or (3) personal liability
may be unnecessary, such as where the property's value adequately secures the loan or the
loan security is the borrower's only asset. Javaras, Nonrecourse Debt in Real Etate and Other
Investments, 56 TAxEs 801, 801 (1978).
6 Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. at 11. Mrs. Crane had argued that her equity in the
property was its basis. See text accompanying notes 39 & 41 infra.
7 Limited partnerships are an attractive investment form because a limited partner's
liability for the partnership's losses is limited to the amount of the partner's investment. See
Javaras, sufra note 5, at 802.
8 I.R.C. § 163(a).
9 The tax shelter collapses when the cash outlay for interest and principal repayment
equals the tax deduction for interest and depreciation, because the taxpayer must then start
paying for all the tax benefits he has received. See generall' Weidner, Realty Shelters: Nonrecourse
Financing, Tar Reform, and Profit Purpose, 32 Sw. L.J. 711, 711-13 (1978).
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tween principal repayment and the depreciation deduction. 10
The widespread use of nonrecourse debt in such tax shelters, as
well as in the financing of nondepreciable real estate," prompted
Congress in 1976 to enact section 46512 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code), which limited loss and depreciation deductions to that
amount the taxpayer has at risk.' 3 Section 465(b)(4) states further
that a taxpayer is not at risk with respect to nonrecourse financing.'
4
Section 465 actually does little to hinder real estate arrange-
ments, however. Although Congress, in the original Tax Reform Act
of 1976,15 chose real estate shelters as a primary area for reform, sec-
tion 465 omits them from coverage.1 6 Thus, taxpayers can still claim
depreciation in real estate investments without considering the at-
risk limitation. ' 7 Because the real estate lobby has effectively guaran-
teed that real estate tax sheltering would continue to increase after
the Tax Reform Act of 1976,18 pre-1976 tax shelter principles will
apply to an even greater number of taxpayers and transactions.
Taxpayers have encountered problems in recent tax shelter in-
vestments in low-income housing. Taxpayers often establish such in-
vestments as general or limited partnerships, which, like other tax
shelters, feature heavy mortgage financing and maximum deprecia-
tion deductions. Consequently, the partnership will quickly reach the
point where the property's adjusted basis falls below the amount of
10 Id at 711, 713.
11 See Javaras, supra note 5, at 802.
12 I.R.C. § 465, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204(a), 90
Stat. 1531, amended by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 201 (a), 92 Stat. 2814.
13 I.R.C. § 465(a)(1) provides that "any loss from such activity for the taxable year shall
be allowed only to the extent of the aggregate amount with respect to which the taxpayer is at
risk. . . for such activity at the close of the taxable year." By limiting the taxpayer's allow-
able loss, the provision obviously limits his depreciation deductions also.
14 I.R.C. § 465(b)(4) provides that "a taxpayer shall not be considered at risk with re-
spect to amounts protected against loss through nonrecourse financing ..
15 H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101(a), 207, 208 (1975).
16 I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) provides that "the holding of real property. . . shall be treated
as a separate activity, and subsection (a) [limitation of losses to amount at risk] shall not
apply to losses from such activity."
17 33 Sw. L.J. 1257, 1268 n.2 (1980). The 1976 Tax Reform Act's recapture provisions,
which prevent a taxpayer from converting ordinary income into capital gains by selling a
depreciated § 1231 asset, deals with real estate activities. Section 1250, however, which does
apply to real property, recaptures only the depreciation taken in excess of the straight-line
depreciation; on the other hand, § 1245 may recapture all depreciation allowed or allowable,
rather than only the accelerated portion of the depreciation. Collins & Doliner, The ".At Rirk"
Provisions The Internal Revenue Code's New Double Basi Concept, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 185, 202 &
n.87 (1977). Collins and Doliner present an excellent discussion of the effect of the "at-risk"
provisions on tax shelters.
18 Collins & Doliner, supra note 17, at 202, 211, 221.
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mortgage indebtedness, resulting in the possibility of a taxable gain.
Because by this time the fair market value is often less than the mort-
gage, the owner of the mortgaged property, especially during an eco-
nomic recession, may be unable or unwilling to continue making
mortgage payments. If the mortgagor then chooses to rid himself of
the property, he faces the possibility of having to recognize a taxable
gain.
19
A different type of problem arises with unimproved land subject
to nonrecourse debt. Because sections 167 and 16820 permit no de-
preciation on this type of land, the owner's adjusted basis will equal
the property's purchase price plus improvements. Thus, any pay-
ment on the mortgage principal produces an outstanding indebted-
ness of less than the adjusted basis. If the fair market value of
the land drops below the amount of the outstanding mortgage, the
owner may decide to discontinue mortgage payments, since the land
is not worth the amount of the mortgage.21 Such a scenario occurred
often in the stagnant real estate market of the late 1970s and early
1980s. In such a situation, the owner may either wait for the mortga-
gee to foreclose and use the foreclosure sale proceeds to at least par-
tially satisfy the mortgagor's debt, or execute a deed in lieu of
foreclosure, thus transferring ownership of the land to the mortgagee
in full settlement of the outstanding mortgage debt.22 In the second
instance, the mortgagor realizes a loss, because the property's ad-
justed basis exceeds the outstanding mortgage balance (the potential
amount the mortgagor could "realize" on the conveyance of the
deed). The remainder of this note analyzes the mortgagor's alterna-
tive to convey a deed in lieu of foreclosure when the balance of the
outstanding mortgage exceeds the fair market value of the property.
19 Weiss, The Crane Case Updated, 32 TAX LAW. 289, 302-03 (1979). In such a situation, a
sale or exchange may produce a phenomenon known as the "phantom gain," which is a
taxable gain unaccompanied by a receipt of cash with which to pay the resulting taxes. This
problem may arise whenever the mortgage on the property, the potential amount realized,
exceeds the property's adjusted basis. See id at 303; I. FAGGEN, D. BLOcKOWIcZ, J.
ScHWIETERs, D. BRADFORD, J. BROWN, M. SCHWARZ, R. STEVENS & D. WATERS; FEDERAL
TAXES AFFECTING REAL ESTATE 12-17 (5th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as FAGGEN] . See also
Part II C infra.
20 Code section 167 allows depreciation deductions on property placed in service prior to
January 1, 1981, while section 168 governs depreciation deductions for property placed in
service after December 31, 1980 under the new Accelerated Cost Recovery System.
21 Note, Voluntag Convyancer of Propery Encumbered by Nonrecourse Debt: Capital Versus Ordi-
nag Losses and The "Sale or Exchange"Requirement, 13 GA. L. REV. 243, 247 n.20 (1978) [herein-
after cited as GEORGIA Note].
22 Id at 245.
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A. The Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure
A mortgagor's voluntary transfer of the deed to the mortgagee in
lieu of foreclosure results when the mortgagee agrees to accept the
deed transfer in full settlement of the outstanding mortgage debt.
23
A valid transfer of a deed in lieu of foreclosure requires only that the
mortgagee accept the mortgagor's deed.
2 4
A mortgagor may wish to voluntarily convey property to the
mortgagee for one of a number of reasons. Those reasons include: (1)
the ability to select the year in which he will recognize gain or loss;25
(2) the desire to claim an ordinary loss; 26 (3) an attempt to escape all
or a part of the gain by claiming renegotiation of the purchase price
where the mortgagee is also the seller;2 7 (4) quick relief from personal
liability for additional property operating costs;28 and (5) avoiding
mortgagee pressure, particularly if the mortgagee holds mortgages on
other property of the debtor, or if the debtor has other transactions
pending with the mortgagee.
2 9
Conveying a deed in lieu of foreclosure affords the mortgagee
the advantages of avoiding the cost, delay, bad publicity, and uncer-
tainties associated with foreclosure sales,30 and avoiding an unneces-
sary additional loss that would result from the costs of an immediate
foreclosure.
3 1
Although conveying a deed in lieu of foreclosure can benefit the
23 66-2d TAx MNGM'T (BNA) Real Estate - Mortgages A-25 (1976).
24 Shillingburg, Wizding Up Real Estate Tax Shelters.- Problems and Solutions, 2 J. REAL EST.
TAx. 405,407 (1975) (noting Marks, Mortgages and Mortgage Foreclosure in New York § 166 (1961
& 1975 Gum. Supp.)).
25 Boris, Ta Planning in Connection with the Restructuring and Recasting of Real Estate Transac-
tions, Moratoriums, Foreclosures, Deeds in Lieu, 35 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx. 963, 988 (1977).
26 Id But see Part III infia for a discussion of this taxpayer alternative in light of recent
developments.
27 Boris, supra note 25, at 988. See niote 70 infra for an explanation.
28 Boris, supra note 25, at 988.
29 Id
30 Handler, Tax Consequences of Mortgage Foreclosures and Transfers of Real Property to the Mort-
gagee, 31 TAx. L. REV. 193, 212 (1976).
31 G. ROBINSON, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE 9-9 (3d ed. 1979). De-
spite certain advantages, the mortgagee may wish to avoid the deed in lieu of foreclosure
because of the risks involved, namely: (1) the voluntary conveyance of the deed within 90
days of an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against the debtor could be set aside as a
voidable preference (if made within the prior one year, it may also be set aside as a voidable
preference if the mortgagee, among other things, was an insider vi-. the debtor), Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1979); (2) a voluntary transfer might not cut off
junior creditors and lienors; (3) the deed could be deemed a merger, and cause junior credi-
tors to take priority over the mortgagee; (4) the deed could be subject to a transfer tax; (5) the
mortgagee may have to take the deed subject to existing leases or tenancies that a foreclosure
proceeding would have extinguished; (6) concerns about title problems and title insurance;
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mortgagee and the debtor, the method has been vexatious to the
I.R.S. and the courts, particularly when nonrecourse debt rather than
recourse debt encumbers the transferred property. The dichotomy of
scholarly and judicial opinion 32 concerning the proper measurement
of the amount realized by the mortgagor when the amount of the
nonrecourse debt exceeds the property's fair market value is confus-
ing to taxpayers, 33 as is the even wider split of authority concerning
whether such a voluntary transfer for no in-hand consideration meets
the "sale or exchange" requirement 34 for capital loss treatment.
3 5
II. Crane's Footnote 37: What is the "Amount Realized"?
A. Crane v. CommzsionerM
6
The Crane case, which spawned the modern tax shelter, involved
a taxpayer who received an apartment building and lot, which were
subject to a nonrecourse mortgage, as beneficiary of her husband's
estate. The property's mortgagee permitted Mrs. Crane to continue
operating the property; however, the unpaid interest arrearage led
the mortgagee to threaten foreclosure. Mrs. Crane then sold the
property, subject to the mortgage, to a third party for $3,000, paid.
$500 in sale expenses, and reported a taxable gain of $1,250. 37 After
the sale, however, Mrs. Crane was no longer liable for the $255,000
mortgage that had encumbered the property.38 The Supreme Court
agreed with the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
(Commissioner) that this amount represented a realized gain to Mrs.
Crane in addition to her receipt of cash.
Mrs. Crane argued that the "property" that she inherited and
later sold was merely the equity in the asset. Since the building was
fully mortgaged, her equity was zero.39 Upon selling the equity, Mrs.
Crane received $2,500 after expenses, so she reasoned that this was
and (7) questions of valuation for purposes of a bad debt deduction. See Boris, supra note 25,
at 990.
32 See Part II infra. The tax effects of a deed in lieu of foreclosure involving recourse debt
are not explored in this note.
33 Se text accompanying notes 21-22 sura.
34 I.R.C. § 1222.
35 See Part III incfa.
36 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
37 Id at 3-4. Under § 117 of the Revenue Act of 1938, only 50% of the gain realized on
the sale of a capital asset had to be taken into account if the property had been held for more
than two years. Id at 4 n.3.
38 Id at 3. /
39 Id
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her amount realized 40 for purposes of computing gain on the sale.
The Commissioner contended that Mrs. Crane's "property" was
the real estate, and not merely her equity in it. This notion, the
Court agreed, comports with the ordinary meaning of "property,"
'4'
and with the Commissioner's interpretation of the term, since treas-
ury regulations and estate tax law42 had previously valued property
in this manner. Finally, the Court stated that, under Mrs. Crane's
theory, depreciation deductions based upon an "equity" basis would
fall far short of the actual physical exhaustion of the property, and
that a basis recomputation would have to follow each mortgage pay-
ment.43 Thus, the Court accepted as the correct basis the property's
full value, undiminished by mortgage balances.
44
The Court also addressed the issue of the meaning of the phrase
"amount realized." The Court rejected the notion that Mrs. Crane
would accept an "amount realized" of $2,500 on the sale of a
$250,000 asset 45 and thus take a 99 per cent loss. 4 6 The Court dis-
counted this possibility in view of its holding regarding the meaning
of "property.147 Then, capitalizing on Mrs. Crane's concession that
the debt would have been included in the "amount realized" had she
been personally liable on it and had the purchaser either paid or
assumed it, 4 8 the Court held that the amount realized on the transfer
included the mortgage transferred with the property irrespective of
whether or not the transferor was personally liable on the debt.
49
Two primary principles emerge from Crane. First, the taxpayer
must include in his basis the amount of a mortgage to which the
acquired property is subject. Thus, the taxpayer can depreciate the
value of the property encumbered by nonrecourse debt as well as
40 Section 111(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1938 (the predecessor of current
§ 1001 (b)) defined "amount realized" as "the sum of any money received plus the fair market
value of the property (other than money) received." § 111(a) (the predecessor of current
§ 1001(a)) defined "gain. . . from the sale of property" as "the excess of the amount realized
• . . over the adjusted basis . Adjusted basis is, for most assets, original cost plus im-
provements, less depreciation.
41 331 U.S. at 6.
42 Id at 7. The Court cited numerous provisions of the Code and regulations supporting
the proposition that the "value" of property was its value undiminished by liens. See id at 7
nn.17 & 18.
43 Id at 9-10.
44 Id at 11.
45 See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
46 331 U.S at 13.
47 Id See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
48 331 U.S. at 13.
49 Id at 14.
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that portion of the property acquired with cash. Second, the tax-
payer must include in the amount realized from the sale the amount
of nonrecourse debt to which property is subject when sold.
Inexplicably, however, the Court also chose to respond to a hy-
pothetical situation posed in Mrs. Crane's reply brief,50 and thus in-
scribed "the most famous footnote in tax history" 5' as an answer that
the Court should never have given. In footnote 37 of the opinion, the
Court stated:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of
the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot real-
ize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different prob-
lem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the
property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving
boot. That is not this case.
52
Thus, when dealing with nonrecourse debt, tax shelter investors have
relied on footnote 37 to limit to the fair market value of the underly-
ing property the amount realized upon a voluntary conveyance.
B. Property Fair Market Value as the Amount Realized
Commentators have debated the propriety of, and noted the
problems resulting from, treating the entire amount of nonrecourse
debt as the amount realized upon a deed transfer in lieu of foreclo-
sure. Though Crane's footnote 37 is the only judicial evidence sup-
porting the notion that the property's fair market value limits the
amount realized upon conveyance, 53 taxpayers challenging the basic
50 Mrs. Crane's reply brief, in attacking the inclusion of nonrecourse debt in the amount
realized on the transfer, posed the following hypothetical situation:
Suppose that the real estate was unimproved and at the death of the deceased the
amount of the mortgage exceeded the value of the real estate. According to the
Commissioner's theory, if the devisee later sold his equity for one dollar, he would
have a taxable gain equal to the difference between the value of the real estate at
the date of death and the amount of the mortgage at the time of sale plus one dollar
in cash. Does the Commissioner seriously contend that the devisee would realize a
taxable gain in a case like this?
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) [hereinafter cited
as Crane brief].
Earlier, the taxpayer in her reply brief had also stated that "[t]he issues involved in this
case, however, do not depend upon the question of depreciation. The same issues would be
presented even if the real estate had been unimproved and had not been susceptible of depre-
ciation at all." Crane brief at 5. One commentator believes that these two excerpts are the
source of Crane's footnote 37. See Note, Millar:Jiequiem for Crane'r Footnote 37, 41 U. P=r. L.
REv. 343, 351 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PrrrSBURGH Note].
51 Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REv. 277 (1978).
52 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
53 See Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginag Supreme Court
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Crane holding also have strong policy arguments to assist them.
The taxpayers' policy argument develops as follows: because
nonrecourse debt is secured only by the underlying property, the
most that a nonrecourse debtor can realize upon a conveyance is the
fair market value of that property, i.e., the debtor has only the value
of this property at stake. Because the mortgagee cannot reach the
mortgagor's personal assets to satisfy the remaining debt, the mortga-
gor is freed from liability only to the extent of the property's fair
market value. Because the mortgagor is liable for no more than the
fair market value, he realizes a benefit upon the mortgage's discharge
only to the extent of the property's fair market value. The amount
realized thus should not include the amount of debt in excess of the
property's value at the time of the deed transfer.
54
Most lawyers agree that the nonrecourse debtor does receive a
benefit from the amount of the debt which exceeds the property's fair
market value; however, the time at which the debtor receives the
benefit is another policy argument favoring the taxpayer. Any bene-
fit to the debtor occurs when he acquires the property or subse-
quently finances it. Although the taxable event with which the
parties are concerned is the sale or other disposition of the property, the
I.R.S. nevertheless taxes as the amount realized theprior benefit re-
ceived from the excess of debt over the property's fair market value.
Professor Bittker attacks the overly simplistic approach the
Court used in Crane to solve the dilemma concerning the amount
realized.55 Bittker asserts that Crane overstates the resemblance be-
tween recourse and nonrecourse obligations.5 6 He contends that the
Court classified together two very different types of obligations only
Opinion, 21 TAx L. REV. 159 (1966); Halpern, Footnote 37and the Crane Case: The Problem That
Never Really Was, 6J. REAL EST. TAx. 197, 216 (1979).
54 See Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A CuIrent View of Some Tax Eect
in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 85 (1969); Halpern, supra note 53, at 214; 33 Sw.
L.J. 1257, 1265 (1980).
Professor Halpern illustrates this point as follows: assume that A, a personally liable
debtor, mortgages property worth $80 to secure a debt of $100. When A's debt is cancelled,
his net worth increases by $100, not just $80, because $100 of his assets are freed from liabili-
ties. Assume that B, a nonrecourse debtor, likewise mortgages his property. When B's debt is
cancelled, his net worth increases by only $80, because only $80 of his assets are freed from
liabilities. Halpern, supra note 53, at 214.
55 See Bittker, sura note 51.
56 Id at 282. The Court noted that the mortgagor, by having reported gross rentals as
her income and having paid and deducted interest on the mortgage, must treat the mortgage
conditions exactly as if they were the mortgagor's personal obligations. The Court added
that, upon a transfer subject to the mortgage, the benefit to the mortgagor is as real and
substantial as if the mortgage debt were discharged or an equivalent personal indebtedness
had been assumed by another person. 331 U.S. at 14 & n.38.
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for reasons of administrative simplicity.57 Had the Court in Crane
recognized in its opinion the difference between recourse and nonre-
course obligations, it may have lessened the resulting confusion.
Another author58 believes that the Crane decision was based
upon the Court's desire for symmetry between the basis and amount
realized rather than upon a strict construction of the Code. The
Court's analogy of nonrecourse debt to recourse debt, based upon
fair market value equaling the moirtgage debt, may have pervaded
the Court's entire opinion. This rendered the analogy inapplicable
to fact situations not contemplated by the Court in Crane.5 9
Although few courts have interpreted or relied on Crane's foot-
note 37, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did
apply it in 1981 in Tufts v. Commissioner.60 The court in Tufts held
that the fair market value of the property securing a nonrecourse
debt limits the extent to which the I.R.S. can include the debt in the
amount realized on disposition of the property.6' The court empha-
sized that Crane had concerned property mortgaged at less than its
fair market value,62 and urged that the "double deduction" argu-
ment mentioned in Crane63 had been overemphasized as a basis for
57 Bittker, supra note 51, at 282. The primary difference between recourse and nonre-
course debt consists of the mortgagor's personal liability for a recourse debt and his lack of
personal liability for a nonrecourse debt. Thus, while both a recourse mortgagor and a nonre-
course mortgagor may report the income and deductions from the property in the same man-
ner, see note 56 supra, the nonrecourse mortgagor could abandon the property without
personal liability for the deficiency amount when the property's value drops below the mort-
gage balance. The recourse mortgagor, being personally liable on the debt, could not aban-
don the property without being personally liable. See also note 4 supra.
58 Townsend, Footnote 37 of Crane: Mat Is the Nature of the Income?, 4 REv. OF TAX. OF
INDIV. 128 (1980).
59 Id at 134-35.
60 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cer. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3873 (U.S. May 4, 1982) (No.
81-1536), revog 70 T.C. 756 (1978). The taxpayer and his partners, in order to finance con-
struction of an apartment complex, secured a $1.8 million nonrecourse loan. Adverse eco-
nomic conditions prevented the complex from earning enough income to pay off any of the
loan principal, and after a year the property had declined in value to $1.4 million. All of the
partners then sold their partnership interests to a third party, receiving no consideration other
than the third party's agreement to pay the partners' expenses of the sale up to $250. 651
F.2d at 1059.
61 651 F.2d at 1063. See Friedland, Tufts and Millar. Two New Views ofthe Crane Case and
Its Famous- Footnote, 57 NOTRE DAME LAw. 510 (1982), for a thorough discussion of Tufl. and
its implications.
62 651 F.2d at 1062.
63 331 U.S. at 15. The "double deduction" theory, perhaps more properly referred to as
the "double benefit" theory, compels the taxpayer including nonrecourse debt in his deprecia-
tion basis to also include the debt in his amount realized upon the sale or other disposition of
the asset. This theory precludes the taxpayer from receiving the benefits of an amount real-
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the Crane decision. 64
The court in Tufts, however, erred in asserting that any tax ben-
efit received by the mortgagor from prior deductions is already fac-
tored into the gain equation through adjustments to basis (such as
depreciation) under section 1016. The court reasoned that requiring
nonrecourse debt to be included in the amount realized in excess of
fair market value would be taxing the taxpayer twice on the same
portion of the gain.65 The court's reasoning was faulty in two signifi-
cant respects. First, the court concentrated on the property's ad-
justed basis, although the issue before it was the determination of the
amount realized. Second, the court apparently assumed that depre-
ciation recapture66 would remedy matters upon disposition of the
property. To the contrary, the amount of depreciation attributable
to an inflated basis obtained through nonrecourse financing is never
subject to recapture if the amount realized is limited to the property's
fair market value.67 Tufts will go before the Supreme Court shortly. 68
The Court should reverse the Fifth Circuit's conception of the recap-
ture rules and recognize that the excess nonrecourse debt must some-
how be taxed. A decision for the Commissioner in Tufts will restore
the status quo and perpetuate the Crane doctrine.
C. Discharged Indebtedness as the Amount Realized
The majority of courts hold that the fair market value of the
property transferred under a deed in lieu of foreclosure is immaterial
in computing the gain or loss from the disposition of property. 69 This
ized that excludes the amount of the debt after that taxpayer has reaped the benefits of a
debt-inflated basis. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text in/a.
64 651 F.2d at 1060. The Tufts court believed that the Court's "double deduction" argu-
ment in Crane was merely a response to Mrs. Crane's contention that she had not been taxed
on income within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment.
65 Id at 1061. The court reasoned that adjusting the asset's basis downward due to the
§ 1016 depreciation deduction, combined with requiring the previous depreciation tax bene-
fits to be included in the amount realized, results in taxing some part of the gain twice. Id at
1061. This reasoning is premised, however, on the questionable assumption that the taxpayer
could not have received a benefit greater than the property's fair market value. If the amount
of the mortgage were accepted as the amount realized, no "double taxation" argument could
be made.
66 See note 17 supra.
67 The depreciation recapture provision, I.R.C. § 1250, will fail to recapture any amount
by which the depreciation subject to recapture exceeds the fair market value of the property,
if the property's fair market value limits the amount realized, as the Fifth Circuit held in
TuPt.
68 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3873 (U.S. May 4, 1982) (No.
81-1536), reu' 70 T.C. 756 (1978).
69 See, e.g., Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656 (1977), afd, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert.
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result may be justified by one of three approaches. Under the first, a
mortgagor executing a deed in lieu of foreclosure is treated as having
sold the property to the mortgagee for the amount of indebtedness
discharged. 70 When the debtor disposes of property that is mort-
gaged in excess of its value, the amount of the mortgage represents an
amount of unrepaid borrowing. As a result, if the mortgage is not
fully included in the amount realized, then the unrepaid borrowing
in excess of the property's value will escape taxation entirely. At
some point on or before the disposition of the property through the
transfer of the deed, the borrower must have enjoyed a taxable bene-
fit by discharging an obligation with property worth less than the
amount of that debt.
7'
A second, more general, but less tested, approach involves the
application of the principle first enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. 72 The Glenshaw Glass principle di-
rects courts to give Code section 61(a)73 a liberal construction, be-
cause Congress intended to tax all gains unless specifically
exempted. 74 A gain (amount realized) arises from the disposition of
property when a deed in lieu of foreclosure is executed. Because the
taxpayer would realize an accession to wealth from the transaction,
he should be taxed on the gain.
75
A third approach favoring the inclusion of the indebtedness
amount in the amount realized is the "double deduction," or "double
denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 649 (195 1), afd, 198
F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952); Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979); Mendham
Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320 (1947); Lutz & Schramm Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 682
(1943).
70 G. ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 9-9.
71 Halpern, supra note 53, at 218.
An alternative judicial approach is the reduction-of-purchase-price doctrine, which can
be summarized as follows: where the mortgagor conveys property back to the mortgagee-
seller in settlement of a mortgage debt that exceeds the property's fair market value, a court
may conclude that an agreement existed between the debtor and creditor to reduce the prop-
erty's purchase price rather than to consummate a sale. The mortgagor's amount realized is
thus reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the debt and the value of the
property, and there is a corresponding reduction in his adjusted basis for the property. Del
Cotto, Sales and Other Dispositions of Property Under Section 1001. The Taxable Event, Amount Real-
ized and Relatedt9'oblems of Basi, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 219, 318-19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Sales and Other Dispositions]. See Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940); Nutter
v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 480 (1946); Rabinowitz & Berenson, The Failing Real Estate Investment
and the Federal Income Tax, 34 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx. 357, 371 (1976).
72 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
73 I.R.C. § 61(a) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided. . . gross income means
all income from whatever sojrce. derived. .. .
74 348 U.S. at 430. See Sales and Other Dispositions, supra note 71, at 227.
75 348 U.S. at 431.
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
benefit," argument presented in Crane and subsequent cases.76 The
double deduction argument arises where the mortgagor takes a de-
preciation deduction calculated upon a basis that includes the
amount of the nonrecourse debt, but where the mortgagor does not
account for those deductions when he reports his gain or loss on the
property's disposition. The policy sought to be promoted by the
double deduction argument is consistency-if the taxpayer is to ben-
efit by depreciation'deductions that are based on a debt-inflated ba-
sis, then he ought also to include that debt in the amount he realizes
upon the disposition of the underlying property.
7 7
Although courts were initially reluctant to probe Crane's foot-
note 37,78 the I.R.S. eventually decided to test the footnote in Reve-
nue Ruling 76-111.79 The I.R.S. ruled in Revenue Ruling 76-111
that gain or loss upon a voluntary surrender of mortgaged assets is
recognized to the extent of the difference between the amount of the
debt cancelled and the basis of the assets transferred. The I.R.S. fur-
ther stated that, irrespective of inferences that may be drawn from
footnote 37, the amount realized is the amount of indebtedness can-
celled, regardless of the fair market value of the assets at that time.80
Thus, the I.R.S. explicitly rejected footnote 37. Recent Treasury reg-
ulations have also followed those court decisions that include the
amount of discharged debt in the amount realized, even though the
debt exceeds the fair market value of the underlying property. 81
Judicial response to footnote 37 started when the Tax Court in
76 See, e.g., Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978), afg 67 T.C. 656 (1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978), rev'd, 651 F.2d
1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3873 (U.S. May 4, 1982) (No. 81-1536). See
note 63 infra, and note 77 supra.
77 The double deduction, or double benefit, theory compels the taxpayer to include in
the amount realized the amount of the debt. Because he used the amount of the debt in
calculating his basis for depreciation, he cannot later claim that the amount realized does not
include the amount of the debt. PITTSBURGH Note, supra note 50, at 347. See note 63 supra.
78 The First Circuit in Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (lst Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 926 (1951), avoided the footnote 37 issue by saying there was no evidence that the value
of the property was less than the mortgage. Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357
(2d Cir. 1952), afg 16 T.C. 649 .(195 1), presented the issue, but the petitioner had disclaimed
reliance on footnote 37. 198 F.2d at 358 n.1.
79 1976-1 C.B. 214. The debtors bought cattle from the seller under a nonrecourse loan.
The loan contained a provision allowing the debtor to return the herd to the seller in com-
plete satisfaction of the debt. After a drop in market value, the debtors exercised the option
to transfer the herd.
80 Id
81 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-2(a)(2); 1.1001-2(a)(4)(i); 1.1001-2(b); 1.1001-2(c), Ex. (2);
1.1001-2(c), Ex. (7) (1980).
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Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner82 stated that the Supreme
Court appeared to be reserving its views on the amount realized
under the situation postulated in the footnote.83 Recently, in Millar v.
Commissioner,84 the Third Circuit rejected outright any application of
footnote 37. The court noted that footnote 37 was dictum and in-
volved a different time and different set of legal circumstances. 85 The
Third Circuit in Millar concluded that footnote 37 should not affect
the principal holding in Crane, and that amount realized includes the
entire amount of nonrecourse debt. Though not specifically address-
ing footnote 37, the Tax Court has cited and followed Millar.
8 6
It now appears that at least the First (Parker v. Delaney8 7), Second
(Woodsam Associates), and Third (Millar) Circuits agree with the Tax
Court and the I.R.S. that the amount realized on the disposition of
property by the conveyance of a deed in lieu of foreclosure includes
the total amount of nonrecourse indebtedness. A meticulous review
and reversal of Tufts 88 by the Supreme Court should bring the Fifth
Circuit into line with the other circuits and dispel the confusion sur-
rounding Crane's infamous footnote 37.
III. The Nature of the Loss: The "Sale or Exchange"
Requirement
In determining the amount realized, most courts follow the
traditional rule of including the total amount of nonrecourse debt to
which the reconveyed property is subject.8 9 Less agreement, how-
ever, exists as to whether the character of the resulting gain or loss is
capital or ordinary. Of course, the taxpayer will want capital treat-
ment of any gain recognized, and ordinary treatment and full de-
ductibility in the event of a loss.
82 16 T.C. 649 (1951), a fd, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
83 16 T.C. at 655.
84 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978), fg 67 T.C. 656 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
85 577 F.2d at 215.
86 See Winston F.C. Guest, 77 T.C. 9 (1981); Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.
15 (1979). In Brountas v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 491 (1979), the Tax Court cited its opinion
in Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978), re'd, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted,
50 U.S.L.W. 3873 (U.S. May 4, 1982) (81-1536), in holding that nonrecourse debt is fully
includable in basis even though the property securing the debt is worth less than the amount
of the debt. 73 T.C. at 571.
87 186 F.2d 455 (Ist Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951).
88 See notes 60-66 and accompanying text sup ra.
89 See, e.g., Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455
(Ist Cir. 1950), cer. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951); Lutz & Schramm Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C.
682 (1943).
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A. Statutory Requirements for Capital Loss
To receive capital treatment, a gain or loss must result from a
"sale or exchange of a capital asset." 9° If in turn the taxpayer has
held the capital asset for more than one year, the nature of the capi-
tal gain or loss is long-term. 91 The gain or loss is short-term if the
capital asset has been held for one year or less. 92 Real estate invest-
ments generally qualify as "capital assets,"'93 and it is relatively easy
to determine whether the taxpayer has held the asset for the requisite
time period. The traditional difficulty, however, has been in meeting
the Code's "sale or exchange" requirement.
94
The "sale or exchange" requirement helps determine the nature
of a loss sustained on the conveyance of a deed in lieu of foreclosure.
If the Code characterizes the loss as an ordinary loss from the "sale or
disposition of property," 95 it will be available as an unlimited deduc-
tion against ordinary income. 96 On the other hand, a capital loss,
assuming that net capital losses exceed net capital gains, is subject to
limitations on its deductibility against a taxpayer's other income.
97
Consequently, an individual taxpayer is permitted to deduct excess
capital losses from ordinary income up to a maximum of only $3,000
in any taxable year.98 Given the unlimited deductibility of ordinary
losses, a taxpayer with real estate investment losses of several hun-
dred thousand dollars would naturally prefer to characterize such
losses as ordinary.
B. Judicial Characteniation of the Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure
Code section 1001(a) states that the amount realized is com-
puted upon the "sale or other disposition" of property. Code section
1222, however, is a narrower concept that qualifies for capital treat-
ment only property disposed of in a "sale or exchange." Thus, cer-
tain dispositions of property could conceivably result in an amount
realized that does not qualify for capital treatment. As a result, a
90 I.R.C. § 1222(l)-(4).
91 I.R.C. § 1222(3)-(4).
92 I.R.C. § 1222(I)-(2).
93 "Capital assets" are generally those assets not specifically enumerated in I.R.C. § 1221,
and include such things as real estate investments.
94 I.R.C. § 1222(l)-(4).
95 I.R.C. § 1001(a).
96 I.R.C. §§ 165(a), 1001(c).
97 See I.R.C. § 1211.
98 I.R.C. § 1211(a)(2). The remaining loss will be available for carryover to other tax-
able years. I.R.C. § 1212.
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gain resulting from a disposition of property not qualifying as a "sale
or exchange" penalizes the taxpayer by subjecting him to taxation on
the entire amount of the gain as ordinary income; the taxpayer, how-
ever, benefits from a full deduction for ordinary losses.99 Because the
I.R.S. is likely to prefer saddling the taxpayer with capital loss treat-
ment for losses resulting from a deed in lieu of foreclosure, it will
assert that the conveyance of the deed was a "sale or exchange"
within the meaning of section 1222.
However, courts have traditionally viewed a loss resulting from
the conveyance of a deed in lieu of foreclosure as an ordinary loss. In
Commonwealth, Inc. v. Commissioner, 00 a corporation owning real estate
subject to a mortgage executed a consideration-free conveyance in
lieu of foreclosure to the mortgagee. The Board of Tax Appeals held
that, because the mortgagee gave no consideration to the debtor, the
transfer was not a sale or exchange. 10' The Board thus sustained or-
dinary loss treatment, a result that has been followed by the Third
Circuit 0 2 and the Tax Court 0 3 until 1980. The Third Circuit and
the Tax Court, however, relied upon a line of precedent which, with
one minor exception, 0 4 was decided before Crane.
The 1941 Supreme Court decision in Hevering v. Hamme °'05 was
a step in the direction of equalizing the treatment given the disposi-
tion of capital assets by the taxpayer. In Hammel, the Court held that
a loss sustained by a taxpayer on the foreclosure of his property was a
capital loss. Apparently, though, courts did not view the voluntary
deed in lieu of foreclosure as being similar enough to a forced foreclo-
sure sale to warrant the capital loss treatment dictated by Hammel. 10 6
99 See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra. Conversely, sections 1001(a) and 1222 re-
ward the taxpayer for a gain and penalize him for a loss if the disposition of the asset does
qualify as a "sale or exchange," and meets the other requirements for capital gain or loss
treatment.
100 36 B.T.A. 850 (1937).
101 Id at 852.
102 Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1941), a.fg 41-2 USTC (CCH) 9770;
Polin v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1940), reo:g 39 B.T.A. 951 (1939).
103 Jamison v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 173 (1947); Lapsley v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1105
(1941); Baird v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 970 (1940).
104 Fox v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 704 (1974). The court in Fox affirmed the traditional
notion that no sale or exchange occurs when the debtor conveys without consideration prop-
erty subject to nonrecourse debt, citing as authority Crane, Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d
335 (3d Cir. 1941), aj'g 41-2 USTC (CCH) 9770, and Jamison v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 173
(1947). 61 T.C. at 715 n.7.
105 311 U.S. 504 (1941). See also Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 312
U.S. 666 (1941); Electro-Chemical Engraving Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 513 (1941).
106 The Court in Hammel found no basis in the Code or in its legislative history or purpose
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In 1980, the Tax Court in Freeland v. Comm'ssioner10 7 surprisingly
reversed the traditional judicial stance, and held that voluntarily
conveying a deed in lieu of foreclosure produces a capital loss rather
than an ordinary one, because it qualifies as a "sale." 10 8 Further-
more, the conveyance results in a capital loss even in the case of non-
recourse debt. 0 9 The court urged that there existed no reason for the
disparate treatment accorded involuntary, foreclosures and voluntary,
deeds in lieu of foreclosure, since the taxpayer in Freeland would have
nevertheless received sale treatment had he chosen to wait for the
mortgagee to foreclose.' 10 The court also relied on Hammel to state
that Congress probably did not intend to allow the taxpayer to ma-
nipulate the character of his gain or loss by either voluntarily convey-
ing the property or forcing the mortgagee to foreclose.' 1 ' The court
emphasized the similarities between the voluntary reconveyance and
involuntary foreclosure, and concluded that both should be treated
the same for tax purposes. 1 2 The court then averted another "foot-
note 37" situation by stating that, although the amount of the debt
exceeded the value of the property, such a predicament should not
change the character of the transaction.1 13 Thus, the court required
the taxpayer to recognize a capital loss.
for distinguishing between forced and voluntary sales of capital assets resulting in losses, con-
trary to the result reached in cases such as Commonwealth. 311 U.S. at 510.
The requirement of some lower courts that consideration pass to the donor in order for a
voluntary conveyance to become a "sale or exchange" was gleaned from cases such as Blum v.
Commissioner, 133 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1943). In Blum, the Second Circuit held that the con-
veyance of a building resulted in a "sale or exchange" where $250 was paid to the mortgagor's
attorney for handling the deal. Courts did not view the mortgagee's cancellation of the non-
recourse mortgage as in itself constituting consideration to the mortgagor. Id at 449.
107 74 T.C. 970 (1980). In Free/and, the taxpayer purchased unimproved real estate in
California for $50,000, giving the seller $9,000 cash and a purchase-money mortgage for
$41,000. Under California law, the mortgagor was not personally liable for a purchase-
money mortgage. After the value of the property dropped to $27,000, while the unpaid bal-
ance of the note was still $41,000, the taxpayer voluntarily reconveyed the property to the
mortgagee-seller, with neither consideration nor the threat or institution of foreclosure
proceedings.




112 The court noted that, in either case, the mortgagor's interest in the property is termi-
nated and transferred to someone else, with the mortgagor receiving "nothing" from the
transaction. The mortgagor in both cases is relieved of paying taxes and assessments against
the property, because he does not retain possession of it. The court also believed that the
indebtedness was notforgiven in either case, though the taxpayer was relieved of repaying the
debt. Id at 981.
113 id at 982.
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Freeland and its progeny" 4 have also affirmed several I.R.S. rul-
ings stating that a voluntary conveyance of property to the mortga-
gee in exchange for a discharge of the nonrecourse debt it secured is a
"sale or exchange" giving rise to a capital loss. 115 In summary, the
Tax Court and the I.R.S. appear to have made the correct determi-
nation in disregarding the formal differences between the foreclosure
sale and the deed in lieu of foreclosure. Because both have the neces-
sary elements of a "sale or exchange," both will now result in a capi-
tal loss to the mortgagor in a loss situation.
IV. Proposed Alternatives
The judicial trend is currently toward capital treatment of losses
incurred in voluntarily conveying deeds in lieu of foreclosure. The
amount realized on the transfer for tax purposes is likely to be the
full amount of the nonrecourse indebtedness encumbering the prop-
erty, pending the Supreme Court resolution of Tufts V.
Commirsioner."1
6
Judicial analysis in this area is still not settled, and none of the
adopted judicial approaches seems to adequately handle the issue, as
the lack of consensus among the courts illustrates. The courts have
justifiably discarded the distinction between involuntary foreclosure
sales and voluntary transfers of deeds in lieu of foreclosure by holding
that both are "sales or exchanges" that produce capital gains or
losses. 117 Courts have not yet, however, examined the theoretical
support for including in the amount realized the entire amount of
nonrecourse debt discharged pursuant to a reconveyance agreement.
A theoretical problem exists in stating that the mortgagor real-
izes the entire amount of the debt when he reconveys the property to
114 Winston F.C. Guest, 77 T.C. 9 (1981); Arkin v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1048 (1981);
John E. DeGennaro, 49 P-H Memo T.C. 1 80,486 (1980). In DeGhnaro, the court relied on
Freeland to hold, on nearly identical facts, that the loss incurred was capital in nature. In
Arkin, the taxpayer abandoned his interest in a land trust holding property subject to a nonre-
course mortgage. Although the land trust interest was personalty under state law, the court
judged the abandonment to be the equivalent of a sale or exchange; thus, the taxpayer in-
curred a capital loss.
Because Freeland and subsequent Tax Court decisions overruled Commonwealth, Lapslq,
Baird, and Jamison, see notes 100 & 103 supra, its holding indicates that whether the mortga-
gee returned consideration to the mortgagor will no longer be a prerequisite to finding a "sale
or exchange."
115 Rev. Rul. 78-164, 1978-18 I.R.B. 10; Rev. Rul. 76-111,supra note 79; P.L.R. 7811008;
P.L.R. 7744006.
116 See notes 60-66 and accompanying text supra.
117 See notes 107-15 and accompanying text supra.
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the mortgagee.11 8 The mortgagor actually received the entire
amount of the benefit when he obtained the purchase-money mort-
gage or when he subsequently financed the property, not at the time
of the sale. There are several alternatives that should be examined in
an attempt to resolve this theoretical dilemma.
The first alternative is to maintain the judicial status quo-in-
clude in the amount realized the entire amount of the debt upon
disposition of the asset. The present treatment of sales of appreciated
property supports this alternative; that is, though the amount ulti-
mately realized upon the sale is attributable to appreciation in value
over a period of time, the entire amount is taxed at the time of the
sale. The primary rationale for this treatment is its administrative
ease. The taxpayer need not maintain records of accretion or con-
duct annual appraisals, and all parties involved save time and
expenses.
A second alternative is to dissect the conveyance into its compo-
nents. If the conveyance is similar to selling the property for an
amount of cash equal to the amount of the obligation, then there
appear to be two separate components of the "amount realized."
The fair market value of the property is the amount actually "real-
ized" on the transfer, and the transfer is treated as a sale or exchange.
The excess of the indebtedness over the fair market value, on the
other hand, is actually a cancellation of indebtedness," 19 albeit an
involuntary one due to the decline in the property's value. This anal-
ysis treats the difference between the adjusted basis and fair market
value of the property as a capital loss, and the difference between the
amount of the debt and the property's fair market value as ordinary
income from the discharge of indebtedness. This approach has the
advantage of being adaptable, and perhaps better suited, to gain sit-
uations. The stumbling block, however, may be that section
61(a)(12)120 as interpreted requires liability on the part of the mort-
gagor in order to qualify as discharge-of-indebtedness income.
12 '
Since the property is the "debtor" in a nonrecourse indebtedness, sec-
tion 61(a)(12) would not technically apply. An application of this
section at the present time, therefore, appears to require a judicial
118 See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
119 I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided . . . gross income
means all income from whatever source derived, including . . . income from discharge of
indebtedness."
120 See note 119 supra.
121 Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C 15, 31-33 (1979). See also Sales and Other
Dispositions, supra note 71, at 323; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(c), Ex. (7) (1980).
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extension of discharge-of-indebtedness rules to bring the amount by
which the debt exceeds the property's value within section 61 (a) (12).
The third alternative calls for the extension of the section 465
"at-risk" provisions to real estate investments. 22 In this manner, real
estate investors would be limited in their loss deductions to the
amounts they personally have at risk in the venture; those amounts
exclude nonrecourse debt. 23 However, in view of the strong Con-
gressional real estate lobby, the implementation of this alternative is
unlikely.
The fourth alternative, which appears to be the most workable,
is an extension of the tax benefit rule. 24 The mortgagor receives a
benefit, either through tax-free borrowing on the property's value, or
through the depreciation deductions that the taxpayer has taken on a
debt-inflated basis. Under section 111 of the Code,' 25 when a tax-
payer "recovers" that which had given him a tax benefit in a prior
year, the taxpayer recognizes income to the extent of that tax bene-
fit.126 Revenue Ruling 74-396127 holds that, for the purposes of the
122 See notes 11-18 and accompanying text sup ra.
123 See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
124 Courts have defined the tax benefit rule both positively and negatively. Some courts
have interpreted the tax benefit rule as requiring income recognition upon the recovery of an
item that had produced an income tax benefit in a prior year to the extent of that tax benefit.
See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 3 (1970); Dynamics Corp. of America v. United
States, 449 F.2d 402, 412 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Other courts have interpreted the rule to operate as
a limitation upon the "general rule" that the taxpayer must recognize as income in the year
of recovery the recovery of property that was once the subject of an income tax deduction.
The tax benefit rule would thus allow exclusion of the recovered item from income if its initial
use as a deduction provided no tax saving. See Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States,
381 F.2d 399, 401-02 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
Regardless of how it is defined, the rule has developed as a judicial attempt to prevent a "
taxpayer from obtaining the benefit of a deduction that subsequent occurrences have shown
to be unjustified.
125 I.R.C. § 111 is the Congressional codification of the tax benefit principle, and
provides:
(a) General Rule. - Gross income does not include income attributable to the recovery
during the taxable year of a bad debt, prior tax, or delinquency amount, to the extent
of the amount of the recovery exclusion with respect to such debt, tax, or amount.
(b) Definitions. - For purposes of subsection (a) -
(4) Recovery exclusion. - The term "recovery exclusion" . . . means the
amount. . . of the deductions or credits allowed. . . which did not result in a reduction of
the taxpayers tax..., reduced by the amount excludable in previous taxable years
I.R.C. § 111 (emphasis added).
126 Although I.R.C. § 111 expressly allows tax-benefit treatment only for the recovery of
bad debts, prior taxes, and delinquency amounts, see note 125 supra, the Supreme Court has
interpreted section I 11 as having been designed not to limit the application of the tax benefit
rule, but to prevent its demise. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 505-06 (1943) (con-
struing § II1's predecessor, § 116 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 812). The Regu-
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tax benefit rule, a "recovery" is an event that is inconsistent with a
past deduction, and that section 111 does not require that the tax-
payer receive or become entitled to receive money or property.
The Sixth Circuit, in Tennessee Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Com-
missioner,'28 affirmed a divided Tax Court in holding that the tax
benefit rule required the inclusion of the fair market value of tires
and tubes previously expensed by a corporation then liquidating.
Since the tires and tubes were still valuable, this was "inconsistent
with [the] prior deduction,"' 2 9 and gave rise to gross income upon
liquidation of the corporation. 130 Though the tax benefit rule has
broad potential applicability, the proscription against applying the
rule to past depreciation deductions in Code section 111(b)(4) pre-
vents courts from applying the doctrine to deeds in lieu of foreclosure
on depreciable property. Further limitations are the Tennessee Caro-
lina court's limitation of its holding to a distribution in liquidation of
property the cost of which the taxpayer has previously expensed,' 3 1
the difficulty of identifying a recovery during the taxable year in
question, 132 and the peculiar fact situation in the Tennessee Carolina
case. 133
Since the tax benefit rule is generally directed at deductions or
credits previously allowed, which generally offset ordinary income or
tax liability, the subsequent recovery is also expressed in terms of
lations have extended the exclusion treatment to "all other losses, expenditures, and accruals
made the basis of deductions from gross income in prior taxable years," but the section does
not apply to "deductions with respect to depreciation." Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a) (1956).
The Tax Court in Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979), acknowledged
that the taxpayers had received a "tax benefit" by virtue of using nonrecourse debt to inflate
the basis for depreciation, but declined to decide the case by using the tax benefit rule. 73
T.C. at 30 & n.3.
127 1974-33 I.R.B. 10. See also Estate of Block v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338, 340-41
(1939), afdsub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 658 (1940).
128 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), aj'g 65 T.C. 440 (1975), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
129 582 F.2d at 383.
130 The tax benefit concept has also been extended to "recoveries" of prior charitable
contributions, Rosen v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 942 (Ist Cir. 1980), afig 71 T.C. 226 (1978);
Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967); state personal
property taxes paid by a bank on behalf of its stockholders and later refunded to the stock-
holders, Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 61 (1979), aj'd, 641 F.2d 529 (7th
Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1982); prepaid management fees,
Bonaire Development Co. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 789 (1981); and rental items, Estate of
Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663 (1975).
131 65 T.C. at 448 n.7.
132 Id at 450 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
133 The Tax Court applied the tax benefit rule based upon a fictitious receipt of new tires
and tubes in liquidation. Id at 447.
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ordinary income. The inclusion in gross income, if due to deprecia-
tion deductions taken in prior years, should be ordinary income
under the "Arrowsmith principle." In Arrowsmith v. United States, 13 4 the
Supreme Court held that a prior year transaction may be examined
in order that a subsequent event may be accorded consistent treat-
ment. Because the assumption that a nonrecourse debt would be
paid off in its entirety led to the debt's original inclusion in the basis
for depreciation, the Arrowsmith principle holds that the voluntary
reconveyance of the deed in lieu of foreclosure should give rise to
ordinary income, offsetting the previous deductions from ordinary
income.
On the other hand, if the property in question were nondepre-
ciable, no depreciation deductions would result, and the assumption
would have been that the capital asset was worth the amount of the
nonrecourse debt obtained. When later events discredit this assump-
tion, the tax benefit would qualify as capital gain, leaving Freeland
and its progeny 135 to prescribe the correct treatment for the deed in
lieu of foreclosure. Thus, the tax benefit rule should be able to ac-
comodate both capital and ordinary gains and appears to be an ideal
solution; however, an appraisal at the time of reconveyance would be
necessary.
V. Conclusion
The law has finally come to realize that the functional distinc-
tions between a deed in lieu of foreclosure and a foreclosure sale are
not great enough to justify different tax treatment. A capital transac-
tion takes place, and the relieved mortgagor receives the full benefit
of the debt under tax benefit principles. A Supreme Court decision
reversing Tufts would be a step in the direction of ending the guess-
ing game between judges, the practicing bar, and the taxpaying pub-
lic.
Michael P. Ripp
134 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
135 See Part III supra.
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